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The advent of state-sponsored mass highrise housing in the post-war period brought 
into view a range of issues about the role of technology in everyday life. This paper 
draws on approaches in the study of science and technology in order to deepen our 
understanding of the socio-technical aspects of such highrise housing, past and 
present. We elaborate this thinking empirically by examining a 1960s highrise 
development, Red Road, Glasgow. The paper examines the inaugural phase of 
development, and the most recent phase of ‘redevelopment’, the first stage of which is 
demolition. The paper extends existing accounts of residential highrises generally, 
and Red Road specifically, as well as elaborating an alternate analytical framework 
for understanding highrise and supertall dwellings. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to delve into aspects of the socio-technical logics of the 
supertall building, using the analytical lens offered by studies in science and 
technology. We do so empirically through the example of the 28-31-storey 1960s 
public housing highrise development of Red Road, Glasgow (Fig. 1). In 2004 Red 
Road was earmarked for redevelopment, a process that will entail demolition of at 
least one of the eight highrises comprising the estate. Demolition is a fate that has 
befallen many highrises in the UK as social housing authorities deem them to be 
‘unsustainable’. Our approach to Red Road is strategic and illustrative, rather than 
comprehensive. We examine two moments in the life cycle of this highrise 
development: in the first instance, aspects of the inaugural phase of planning and 
building; and, in the second, aspects of the recent phase in which redevelopment, 
including the plan to demolish, is underway. The policy framework that gave rise to 
highrise housing in post-war Britain has been insightfully analysed by Patrick 
Dunleavy (1981). Our return to the UK highrise is not to refute the necessity of such 
policy-based analysis, but to modestly enlarge the cast of actors (both human and 
non-human) that have come together to form the Red Road ‘public housing apparatus’ 
(Dunleavy, 1981, p. 9). Similarly, the story of the Red Road in the history of British 
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highrise housing provision has already been told in compelling detail by architectural 
historians Miles Glendinning and Stefan Muthesius (1994, and Glendinning, 1992). 
Our return to the archive of Red Road is not in order to challenge this existing history, 
but to supplement it conceptually and narratively by looking anew at forgotten aspects 




Fig. 1: Red Road multi-storey flats in 2005. Authors’ image. 
 
The highrise and socio-technical relations 
The shock of the new widely imputed in modernist cultural production, and manifest 
in twentieth-century urban life more generally, was experienced in a particularly 
intimate and conspicuous way in state-sponsored highrise mass housing. The 
commitment of state bureaucracies to provide highrise housing en masse, in high 
densities, and by way of new ‘economies of scale’ and innovative building 
technologies, meant an intensification of the role of technology in domestic life. The 
nexus between technology and domestic life was a central preoccupation of 
architectural visions of housing reform in the twentieth century. Parker and Unwin’s 
interpretation of the Garden City idea, for instance, was enabled by technological 
innovations such as the railway, electricity, and telephone. Similarly, Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s decentralized vision for living, evidenced in his proposal for Broadacre City, 
was predicated on the widespread use of the car enabled by an elaborate freeway 
infrastructure. Yet, in both models such technological catalysts were cloaked by the 
organically inspired housing forms and stood at odds to the nostalgic social worlds 
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envisaged. The architects’ drawings for Letchworth and Broadacre City are telling in 
this respect: the former omits any reference to twentieth-century domestic technology, 
while the latter illustrates unrealized technology (futuristic cars and helicopters) in a 
fantastical, science-fictional style. Representationally speaking, both visions appear to 
be uncomfortable with the existing and emerging technological realities. 
Sociologically speaking, they domesticate technology to fit conventional housing 
visions. The highrise, by contrast, was intended to be a pragmatic, technically driven 
housing solution that would radically re-structure the patterns and quality of domestic 
life. The architectural imagination that gave rise to this form of housing was 
motivated by the potentials – economic, formal, social, spatial – of new materials 
such as steel, innovative construction technologies such as rapid system-building, and 
mechanisms such as passenger lifts and integrated garbage handling systems. The 
highrise instituted new and unprecedented socio-technical configurations not only at 
the macro level of construction and delivery, but also through the micro patterns of 
daily life: accessing one’s front door, removing garbage, insulating oneself from a 
neighbour’s noise, or washing and drying clothes. 
 
The intensified socio-technical relations that mass highrise housing wrought were a 
consequence of the intersection of European avant-garde architectural theory and the 
imperatives of post-war reconstruction and slum clearance (Dunleavy, 1981; Hall, 
1988; Ravetz, 2001). The state housing and planning authorities that responded to 
such imperatives found sustenance in the theoretical speculations of such figures as 
Walter Gropius and Le Corbusier. In the context of the United Kingdom it was, as 
Dunleavy points out, Le Corbusier’s contribution that ‘made by far the greatest 
impact’ (1981, p. 54). Le Corbusier’s famous aphorism, ‘a house is a machine for 
living in’ makes perfectly clear that this avant-garde architectural vision boldly 
embraced the idea of technologised housing. In his book Vers une Architecture (1986 
[1923]) [Towards a New Architecture] (where this aphorism originally appeared) Le 
Corbusier complained that his architectural contemporaries failed to ‘see’, let alone 
exploit, the machinic world that was manifest around them. For Le Corbusier 
contemporary architectural beauty depended upon embracing technological values: 
efficiency, rationality, standardisation, mass-production. In pursuit of this he drew 
inspiration from everyday contemporary objects of technical innovation, such as the 
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car, as much as he did conventional architectural templates. This technological 
orientation was given expression in mass highrise housing in his La Ville 
Contemporaine (1922) (reproduced in his Urbanisme [The City of Tomorrow] (1987 
[1925]). Dunleavy shows how state agencies in the UK came to adopt, develop, and 
implement specific policies based upon the architectural avant-garde’s ‘ethos of 
optimism about technology’ and its faith in the universal applicability of mass 
production building technologies. This vision came to ‘link… high flats with 
technological advance’ as ‘a leitmotif’ of post-war housing reconstruction 
(McCutcheon cited in Dunleavy, 1981, p. 59). In the UK in the period up to the 1970s 
this manifested most boldly in the integration of industrialized building systems with 
the provision of highrise housing (1981, p. 61).i This commitment was followed up 
with official specifications of standards for highrise housing, such that an acceptable 
quality was guaranteed. This is clearly illustrated in the 1961 publication Homes for 
today and tomorrow, otherwise referred to as the ‘Parker Morris Report’. This report, 
written under the auspices of the then Department of the Environment’s Central 
Housing Advisory Committee, sought to advise on ‘standards of design and 
equipment applicable to family dwellings’ (Parker, 1961, p. iv). It addressed family 
housing in general, but with the expectation that highrise housing would form an 
increasing proportion of future public housing stock. Motivated by an ‘appreciation of 
the special needs of those who live on high density estates’ (ibid, p. 28), and a desire 
to replicate in highrise housing the design standards of more traditional low-rise 
housing types, the report devoted a separate section to the highrise (ibid, p. 27). That 
section raised a range of design and space planning issues specific to the highrise, and 
each demonstrating the way in which it was explicitly framed as a housing form 
needing precise technological resolution: sound insulation, communal and private 
space standards, storage, lifts, balconies, indoor and outdoor space ratios, rubbish 
disposal, fire escapes, economical building systems.  
 
In the UK the optimism that saw the rapid and large-scale construction of highrise 
housing in the 1960s was quickly tempered by a range of technical and social 
problems manifest therein. As Dunleavy observed, ‘[h]igh-flat building was the most 
extreme and conspicuous form of mass housing provision [and]…has since become 
one of the most widely proclaimed (if unstudied) “failures” of public policy in this 
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field’ (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 3). In adjudicating ‘why failure?’ technology came to be 
given a determining force. For example, an influential critique of the highrise as a 
mass housing solution was provided by Dutch architect Nicolas Harbraken, in his 
book Supports. Published at the same time as the Parker Morris Report, it positioned 
technology in an entirely different way. Harbraken (1972, p. 46) accused architects 
and planners of being ‘bewitch[ed] by partially-understood technical possibilities’ 
which manifests in an ‘automatism’ and uniformity in housing design.  
 
Social scientific accounts of highrise living often sought to ‘test’ the social effects of 
living in the novel highrise. We might think, by way of example, of the long tradition 
of post-occupancy studies in which resident satisfaction with highrise living is 
measured and charted. A good number of these studies evidence a technological 
determinism, in that it is the highrise form (and its novel technologies) that is called 
upon to explain the quality of life of life of residents within. We can see this 
determinism clearly at work in the ‘science’ of Oscar Newman’s (1972) study of New 
York projects, and Alice Coleman’s (1985) study of London multi-storey housing 
(see also Westergaard and Glass, 1964). In the context of Glasgow, Pearl Jephcott’s 
study of resident views of highrise living, Homes in high flats (1971), drew explicitly 
(although not exclusively) on the case study of Red Road. It did so because the 
supertall character of Red Road meant it was a perfect field laboratory for observing 
problems residents might be experiencing with lifts, circulation systems and height. 
Each of these studies, directly or indirectly, built upon a binarised understanding of 
the relationship between technology and society in which technology was assumed to 
have a determining effect on quality of life. 
 
Modernist architectural housing designs, the technocratic systems of housing 
governance that materialised them, and the early social sciences that commented upon 
them, replicated a very embedded structure for understanding technology in society. 
In each there was carried an assumption about the building technology and the 
occupant as distinct entities, with the technology, often as not, given a determining 
force. Indeed, in this selective sketch of the history of the highrise in the UK this 
structure of understanding manifested in both the vision of it as a housing ‘solution’, 
and the translation of it into a housing ‘failure’. Various accounts of modernity 
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routinely exhibit a technological determinism, although not all of it as instrumental as 
those we have just rehearsed. For example, Heidegger, in his essay ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’, saw technological ‘enframing’ as a negative symptom of 
modernity. For Heidegger technology had been transformed in the modern age from a 
truthful materialisation of human creativity, to an indifferent instrumental field. All 
earthly materials, including human beings, were, in his analysis, a mere a reservoir of 
raw material (the ‘standing reserve’) for technological appropriation (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 5). Furthermore, he felt that modern technology was reshaping complex 
inter-subjective social relations, producing a measurable predictability and delivering 
the pre-conditions for control and regulation (see for a similar view Mumford, 1934). 
As Feenberg notes, for such thinkers modernity is characterised by a society-
technology binary in which a ‘unique form of technical action and thought’ extends 
itself deep into social life, threatening apparently ‘nontechnical values’ (Feenberg, 
2000, p. 295).  More recent theorisations of the role of technology in society have 
challenged this type of thinking. Technology, it is argued, does not simply determine 
social life, rather it co-constitutes a relational field of society and technology. It is to 
some of this alternative thinking about the relationship between technology and 
society that we now turn. 
Theorising the black box 
 
The relationship between society and technology has preoccupied the field of science 
and technologies studies, which, among other things, has sought to understand the 
processes by which certain technologies stabilize, become ubiquitous, and effect 
change in society. Science and technology studies is a theoretically and empirically 
diverse field, and it is not our goal here to chart its scope (see Sorensen and Williams, 
2002), nor even to account in detail for the range of studies that engage directly or 
incidentally with a technology that might variously be described as ‘housing’, 
‘building’ or ‘architecture’. This analytical field has produced numerous and diverse 
encounters with buildings of various types (e.g. Gieryn (2002) on a laboratory, Brain 
(1994) modernist housing, Jenkins (2002) on a commercial office, Jacobs (2006) on 
highrises, as well as studies of environmental innovation in housing technologies (e.g. 
Guy and Shove, 2000; Lovell, 2005) and studies of the consumption of domestic 
technologies (e.g. Barlow and Venables, 2004; Schwartz Cowan, 1989; Shove, 2002). 
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In addition, the leading thinkers within Actor Network Theory have, on occasion, 
illustrated theoretical points by recourse to building processes and housing 
technologies (see as an example Callon and Latour 1981).  
 
Our first step in rethinking the society-technology nexus with regard to the highrise is 
to displace the binary structure sketched above. This is not about substituting a 
reductive technological determinism for a more detailed accounting of social or 
political determinants, as in the revisionist analytical frameworks of, say, Dunleavy’s 
(1981) policy study, or Glendinning and Muthesius’s (1994) architectural history. Nor 
is it simply about highlighting the way users or consumers appropriate housing 
technologies for their own ends (see, as examples, Chua, 1996; Miller, 1988). 
Similarly, recent ‘social constructivist’ styles of analysis (e.g. Jacobs, Kemeny, and 
Manzi, 2004) while useful for articulating more complex sociotechnical constellations 
still tend to retain the social as the primary determining force.  
 
The analytical approach of Actor Network Theory attends more vigilantly to the 
‘seamlessness’ of the socio-technical field (Bijker, 1993; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 
1989; Callon, 1980; Hughes, 1986). A good deal of the analytical labour of studies of 
science and technology has been spent understanding the way technologies and 
socialities co-produce the world. For Latour (2005, p. 81) this task involves tracing 
the history of technological artefacts, and often those that have ‘receded into the 
background’.ii Actor Network Theory does not simply place the categories ‘society’ 
and ‘technology’ as equal ‘actors’ or equivalent ‘determiners’, but re-conceives the 
world as an assemblage of heterogeneous ‘objects’ that cannot, a priori, be 
categorised as technological or social. This conceptualization privileges terms such as 
‘network’ (or assemblage), ‘collective’, ‘symmetry’ and ‘heterogeneity’. 
 
Within studies of science and technology two specific types of socio-technical 
assemblages have attracted much analytical attention: these being the technological 
‘success’ and the technological ‘failure’ (Russell and Williams, 2002, p. 41). Latour 
(2005) articulates the heuristic value of this interest by arguing that successful 
technologies are significant because the socio-technical associations that hold them 
together are so seamlessly enmeshed they become ‘invisible’, while the significance 
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of failed technologies rests with the fact that previously invisible associations are, at 
the moment of failure, revealed. A specific study that has at its heart thinking about 
success and failure is Law and Callon’s (1992) study of the ‘life and death of an 
aircraft’. In it they show that the machine that fails is as interesting to technology 
studies as the machine that succeeds. For it is through the technology that fails that 
one can detect how ‘objects, artefacts, and technical practices come to be stabilized’ 
(Law, 1989, p. 111). And in that story, one comes to understand that context (those 
who make the machine) and content (what is inside the machine) cannot be 
distinguished, that they are part of the socio-technical ‘coevolution’ of the world. 
 
In the theoretical vocabulary that social studies of technology have developed, the 
notion of the ‘black box’ has a special place. The idea of the black box is a focal point 
for understanding the question of socio-technical stability. Latour borrowed the term 
from cyberneticians who use it ‘whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands 
is too complex. In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know 
nothing but its input and output’ (Latour, 1987, pp. 2-3). The cybernetician’s black 
box, Latour argues, allows a range of conditions associated with the development of a 
given technology (for example, controversies that may have been attached to its 
invention) and its inner workings (its complexity, say) to be ‘closed’ off (ibid, p. 3). 
This closure is possible because a range of ‘translations’ (specifications, scientific 
studies, policy formulations, material forms, development targets, to name but a few) 
have variously worked to enrol a wide array of others to the technology such that 
‘none of them can desire anything else any longer’ (Callon and Latour, 1981, 296). 
With the turbulence of its invention consigned to history, its mutability stabilised, it 
can acquire a kind of anonymity. As such, this ‘anonymity’ allows a set of additional 
transformations to occur. Firstly, its status can grow and it can be understood as a 
‘hard fact’ and the work is does taken for granted (Latour, 1987, p. 139). Secondly, it 
can mesh with wider technological or social systems and grow ‘big’. Finally, it can 
become ‘mobile’, for once stabilised a diverse range of end users readily accept and 
deploy it unquestioningly. 
 
When the history of a black box is interrogated what is usually revealed is a mutable 
and controversial past, coloured by the risks individuals and institutions take in 
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developing it (risks to people’s careers, financial risks, political risks), the claims and 
counter-claims that swirl around it, and the divergent trajectories of competing 
materials and technologies. This history leads Latour to claim that technological 
artefacts only ever make provisional claims on the status of black box. A black box 
technology is always susceptible to fresh problematisations, to renewed controversy, 
to unforeseen counter-claims. Scratch the recent history of any black box artefact and 
it usually reveals ‘[u]ncertainty, people at work, decisions, competition, 
controversies’ that can be readily re-activated at any moment in the future (ibid, p. 4). 
Latour characterises this provisional state in economic terms. Black box stability 
depends upon a technological artefact being able to resist counter-claims and shed 
controversy. This state is achieved not simply because the technology is ‘right’, but 
because counter-claims are dissuaded by the escalating ‘cost of disputing’, (ibid, p. 
83). In other words, a new technology achieves black box status when it becomes too 
expensive for rival institutions and agencies (speaking on behalf of rival technologies) 
to generate controversies around it.  
 
In what follows we return to the Red Road highrise with an analytical tool kit based 
on the conceptual frames offered by this alternative (more hybrid, more symmetrical, 
more heterogeneous) model of the relationship between technology and society. As 
we flagged in our introduction, we are interested in two specific moments in the forty-
year history of Red Road: the inaugural phase of development and the current phase 
in which it has been earmarked for demolition. By focussing on dimensions of the 
‘birth’ and ‘death’ of Red Road we are self-consciously replicating a methodological 
strategy in which ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are viewed symmetrically, and equally 
relevant to understanding the ways in which socio-technical events work. A second 
feature of our strategy is that our analysis depends upon case materials gathered by 
way of quite distinct techniques. The evidence of the ‘birth’ of Red Road belongs now 
to the archive, and it is through the many inscriptions deposited there that we are able 
to follow the varied actors (be they visions, policies, building standards, press articles, 
social scientific studies, materials or people) that assembled in the making of Red 
Road. The ‘death’ of Red Road belongs to the present, and it is possible therefore to 
follow the heterogeneous actors involved in this process ethnographically. For the 
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purposes of this paper, we confine our attention primarily to a meeting held to rally 
residents to oppose the decision to demolish. 
 
Part I: Black boxing Red Road 
 
In this section we return to the archive of Red Road and examine some of the socio-
technical assemblages that allowed it to be built. In so doing we are conceiving of 
Red Road as being produced within what Jorgensen and Sorensen (2002, p.198-199) 
describe as a ‘development arena’. This is a dispersed space that incorporates a 
number of locations where action takes place, knowledge produced and visions 
dreamed, as well as artefacts, inscriptions and standards, human participants and 
materials. Our specific interest is in how Red Road garnered the many allies that 
worked to stabilise it, however tentatively and provisionally, as a housing ‘black box’.  
 
Building Red Road 
On the 28th of October 1966 the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr William 
Ross (accompanied by his wife), formally ‘opened’ the first, and tallest, of the six 31-
storey point blocks and two 26 to 28-storey slab blocks which were to be the Red 
Road housing estate.  Its innovative construction consisted of steel frame, supporting 
5” in-situ laid concrete floors, and asbestos-cement insulation board and fully 
compressed asbestos cement sheeting for the outer cladding of the building (Bunton 
and Associates, 1966). The first tower was of a height unprecedented for residential 
construction in Britain.  
 
Red Road was far from finished when it was opened. Half the site was still under 
construction and the 1,350 dwellings would not be completed and ready to let until 
1968. Pictures of the event show people surrounded by the unclad steel skeletons of 
highrises clearly still under construction. Controversies that had attached to the 
project in its conception and construction were effectively set aside that day such that 
the Red Road that was ‘opened’ was assumed to be a ‘closed’ black box. At the 
opening of that first block the then Scottish Secretary William Ross exhorted the 
project construction squads: ‘Let’s get on with it! Put everything you have into the 
completion of these blocks…. Remember what it is for…it is all for the ordinary 
people. It is your job to give them decent homes’. This entreaty, in Latourean (1987, 
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p. 129) terms, serves to stitch the many hands and tools of the workers into the 
machinic logics of a mass housing programme servicing Britain’s post-war housing 
emergency.  
 
The Glasgow Corporation’s response to the post-war housing emergency was slowed 
by the lack of appropriate building sites. Led by Baillie David Gibson, convenor of 
Corporation’s Housing sub-Committee on Sites and Buildings, the Corporation 
devised a scheme which was intended to shorten the period of planning between the 
selection of a site and the commencement of building on it. That scheme ‘envisaged 
the pre-planning of a range of standardised designs for multi-storey flats which would 
be devised specifically with an eye to rapid construction and to making optimum use 
of the Building Department’s own resources’ (Baird Smith, Sinclair Gauldie, and 
Shankley, 1969, p. 4). If a site became available ‘the appropriate plans could be 
selected from the ready-made range, thus curtailing the normal preliminaries of 
designing, detailing and costing’ (ibid,  p. 5). To realise its vision the Glasgow 
Corporation’s Buildings Department needed to be furnished with a multi-storey 
housing ‘black box’: a fully mobile housing design template (or set of templates) 
whose internal spatial and technical specifications were so stable that it could be 
deployed on any site without local adjustments being necessary. By 1960 the Housing 
and Works Department of the Glasgow Corporation submitted to the Sub-Committee 
on Sites and Buildings a report detailing a possible arrangement for the generation of 
highrise design templates. In the same year, the local architectural firm, Sam Bunton 
and Associates, already experienced in the production of multi-storey housing in 
Glasgow, were commissioned to provide ‘designs of standard types of multi-storey 
flats’ or ‘type designs’ (ibid, pp. 5-6). It was expected that these ‘type designs’ would 
take advantage of the Housing and Works Department’s existing resources, 
specifically its concrete-casting plant. There could be no clearer expression of a 
housing black box: a housing type that meshed seamlessly with existing socio-
technical systems, could be deployed in a variety of places, service many users, and 
respond to changing circumstances without having its internal technological 
configurations challenged. Indeed, architect Sam Bunton was so certain of the 
stability of his housing vision that he saw it as having incredible durability such that 
in the future the frames might be reclothed ‘with external walls, windows, internal 
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partitions and finishings using the exciting new materials and methods stemming from 
100 years of progress’ (Glasgow Herald, 1963a). 
 
When Red Road ‘opened’ it was not its ubiquity, but its novelty that gathered allies. 
Its unprecedented scale acted as a rallying point around which supporters swarmed. 
For example, it was seen as a flagship development in a wider modernisation vision 
for Glasgow. Now Glasgow could lay claim to the tallest building in Europe, and one 
whose height was ‘exceptional even in [comparison to] local authority residential 
building in the United States’ (Glasgow Herald, 1966a). In an Evening Times article 
entitled ‘Glasgow’s the tops!’, Red Road was depicted as exhibiting ‘space-age 
innovation’. And in an advertisement sponsored by The Corporation of Glasgow and 
appearing alongside a celebratory newspaper account of Red Road’s ‘opening’, the 
‘Superblock’, as it was dubbed, was one in a list of attributes (such as the motorway) 
that marked Glasgow as a ‘forward-looking city’ (Glasgow Herald, 1966b). Also 
drawn into the opening event were the many contractors, fabricators and suppliers 
who could proudly claim to have contributed materials and labour to the making of 
Red Road: Heatovent Electric (heaters), Turner Asbestos Cement (cladding and 
insulation), Scotcon (‘True Flue’ refuse chutes), A.I.R. Ltd. (‘Airvent’ ventilation 
systems); Stewart Plant (cranes, hoists, pumps and excavators), Weatherite Ltd. 
(aluminium fascias), Drysdale (‘Pyromac’ automatic fire fighting plant), Braithwaite 
and Co (water storage tanks), Bellrock (gypsum inner wall linings), and Veedip,  
supplier of the industrial gloves that covered the many hands that worked to build Red 
Road. And of course steel manufacturers were one of the strongest supporters. In an 
advertisement headed ‘A tall storey…but fact, just the same’, the Lanarkshire Steel 
Company Ltd attributed the acclaim Red Road enjoyed for being the tallest housing 
development in Europe to ‘versatility and adaptability of steel’. (Glasgow Herald, 
1966b). 
 
We wish to take this housing, and the black box status it claimed, as a starting point 
for investigating the work that was required to stabilise it as a successful housing 
solution. Latour points out that the paradox facing ‘fact-builders’ (here those who are 
engaged in making this highrise housing solution) is that ‘they have simultaneously to 
increase the number of people taking part in the action – so that the claim spreads, and 
to decrease the number of people taking part in the action – so that the claim spreads as 
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it is’ (Latour, 1987, pp. 207-208, emphasis in original). In what follows we show how 
the Glasgow Corporation could neither control those who took part in the action of 
making Red Road, nor ensure it ‘spread’ as the design-type they envisaged. We 
encounter these difficulties through two instances in the conception and construction 
of Red Road. The first deals with the material components that were used to build the 
project, and the controversies they carried with them. The second deals with the way 
in which the plan for a highrise design-type was radically altered by the specificities 
of its materialisation.  
 
Materialising Red Road  
We noted earlier that beneath the surface of any black box is uncertainty, competition 
and controversy. We also noted that stability or ‘success’ in a technology is not 
simply about getting its internal workings ‘right’. It is also about relevant social 
groups coming to see that the technology has no problems or doubt attached to it, that 
there are not ‘dissenters’ able to modify it (Pinch and Bijker, 1989, pp. 44-45). In this 
section we look at the way in which the ability of Red Road to lay claim to being a 
housing solution depended upon this kind of work. This work was not focussed, as 
one might expect, on the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ of building high. In 1960s Glasgow it 
seemed there were few dissenters in relation to that vision. Rather, controversy 
emerged around the right way to build high: was it by using conventional building 
technologies like steel reinforced concrete, or was it by adopting new prefabricated 
methods in unison with structural steel framing? 
 
The architect for Red Road had elected to proceed with structural steel. That decision 
was, he argued, a consequence of the very high density requirements (212 ppa) the 
Corporation had set for the relatively small (‘postage stamp’) site (Horsey, 1982, p. 
177). The consequence of this, according to Bunton, was ‘to rise to a height of over 
30 storeys’, well above the ‘practical limitations’ of conventional concrete cross-wall 
systems. And once compelled to build supertall, Bunton argued, it was ‘necessary for 
total safety to turn over to a structural steel frame’ (Bunton, 1969, p.1). Herein was 
established the central socio-technical alliance that materialised Red Road. In this 
moment the quest for a highrise design template, a local housing vision, an architect 
and a housing bureaucracy merged with industrialised production systems and the 
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very building materials such as steel. That socio-technical collective was itself a 
powerful force drawing others to the idea of Red Road as a housing solution. 
 
There was much to be said in favour of using steel frame construction methods, some 
of it was articulated technically and some of it socially. When the Glasgow 
Corporation committed to building multi-storey flats with steel frames at Red Road, it 
was lauded by local construction engineers for providing a ‘progressive lead’ to steel-
makers and steel-workers alike (Glasgow Herald, 1963b). As Bunton noted in a 
Letter to the Editor of the Glasgow Herald (1963c) advocating the adoption of high 
performance steel: 
 
‘[it] is the best material available in the construction field since it brings into 
active participation an array of steel erectors, and the resources of an industry 
which is at present only working at…one third of its capacity’ 
 
The industry, in turn, was explicit in its support of steel in highrise construction. For 
example, in 1963 the North-east Coast and Scottish Heavy Steel Makers joined forces 
and advertised in the Glasgow Herald (1963d). The advertisement sought to reinforce 
the link between ‘new steel’ and highrise building programmes: ‘For multi-storey 
blocks of flats, choose steel….for its speed, its economy, its versatility, its improved 
fabrication and erection techniques’. It also offered information on where readers 
might acquire their ‘Plan to Build in Steel’ booklet, concluding that ‘STEEL IS 





Fig. 2: Advertisement by the North East Coast and Scottish Heavy Steel Makers, 
The Glasgow Herald, 11 March 1963. 
 
The tone of this advertisement, its list of steel’s attributes, its claim to the material’s 
rightness, and its mention of ‘choice’, suggests that the use of steel at Red Road may 
not have been a settled matter. Indeed, for a few months in 1963 the pages of the 
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Glasgow Herald played host to a strident debate between Red Road architect, Sam 
Bunton, and the then Scottish manager of the Cement and Concrete Association, Peter 
Russell. Russell spoke on behalf of a more standard building technology, steel 
reinforced concrete. 
 
The concrete industry was itself adjusting to changing fortunes, in its case those 
resulting from the turn away from on-site ‘muck and wheelbarrow’ construction to 
prefabricated techniques, including those involving steel frames. In an article that was 
responding to a previous article detailing recent innovations in the application of 
structural steel in building, Russell challenged steel’s very ‘rightness’. He did so by 
opening up the matter of fire risk, a risk that is based on steel loosing its structural 
integrity when exposed to relatively low intensity fire. In conventional tall 
constructions of the time, steel was used in unison with concrete (steel reinforced 
concrete) to produce a fire resistant structure. Although Russell’s article does not 
mention Red Road explicitly, its does refer in general terms to Glasgow’s recent 
commitment to ‘build high’ and the ‘paramount importance of fire resistance’ in 
builds over 30 storeys (Glasgow Herald, 1963e). 
 
It is unsurprising that Red Road’s architect should feel compelled to respond. In a 
Letter to the Editor Bunton attends at length to the ‘difficult to comprehend’ 
accusations about the fire risks of structural steel. In its defence he mobilizes the allies 
that reside, by proxy, in international construction industry standards, reminding 
readers that structural steel is always insulated against the spread of fire ‘in 
accordance with world-wide specificational requirements’ such that it is as ‘sound and 
fire proof as any concrete building’ (Glasgow Herald, 1963c). Furthermore any 
architect using structural steel in tall constructions is compelled, he points out, to 
work with fire specialists to determine satisfactory escape routes, the location of fire 
safety doors, and high-pressure water access. Responding to Bunton, in turn, Russell 
reiterates his concern about fire risk, even in structural steel that has insulation 
cladding (Glasgow Herald, 1963f). In doing so he too calls in allies, in this case facts 
produced by a ‘laboratory test’ of the fire resistance performance of steel reinforced 
concrete. In contrast, he has at hand only ‘strong doubts’ about the fire resistance of 
structural steel insulated with ‘light hollow casing’ (as was to be the case with Red 
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Road’s asbestos casing). Bunton forcefully returns to the fray by relegating the 
argument about fire risk to the least factual of categories, that of the ‘red herring’. His 
defence of steel as a construction material for highrise housing is addressed to the 
many others who, unlike Russell, appear to be swarming towards his vision of Red 
Road: ‘It is…imperative to make it clear and categorical that his remarks are 
completely misleading, and that people who reside in tall steel-framed buildings 
protected and encased in fire-resisting materials do so in the maximum conditions of 
security and safety’ (Glasgow Herald, 1963g).  
 
In this set of exchanges about the technical merits of steel versus concrete, the 
material technology that was to guarantee the adequate fire resistance of structural 
steel is mentioned only in passing. To ensure the structural integrity of steel in this 
highrise housing context Bunton must combine it with another material, asbestos. 
Although today asbestos is known to pose serious dangers to human health, and so is 
deemed unsuitable as a building material, in 1963 this danger was not widely 
accepted and so it could still be mobilized as a powerful ally of steel. iii As Bunton 
confidently reminds readers in an article featuring Red Road in International Asbestos 
Cement Review, ‘1 and 1/2 hours protection to the structural steel work’ (Bunton, 
1966, p. 26). Steel and asbestos in partnership with social others operate as the 
collective that stabilises Red Road and holds it together, albeit provisionally, as a 
viable safe housing solution.  
 
Translating Red Road 1 
The last of the completed dwellings in the Red Road development were handed over 
to the Glasgow Corporation in December 1968, some 5 years after piling had begun 
on site. But it was over a year earlier, in October 1967, and when only 40% of houses 
were complete, that a request was issued by Councillor Muir to the City Chamberlain 
to establish an Inquiry into Red Road. An Inquiry such as this had as its remit to 
enquire into the facts of a situation, in this case the overspend on construction and the 
failure of relevant parties to predict that overspend. Of course a more securely 
stabilised black box, effectively insulated from dissenting voices, would not require 
such scrutiny. In contrast, technologies that malfunction or fail very quickly attract 
scrutiny because the varied allies that had worked to hold them together demonstrably 
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stop doing so (see Law 2003, Jacobs 2006). When the Inquiry looked inside Red 
Road and found other facts, it began a process that opened it up again, transforming 
Red Road from a widely supported housing fact into a more fragile and vulnerable 
socio-technical entity. Under the scrutiny of the Inquiry even the use of steel, the 
material that seems so central to Red Road’s black box status, came to be questioned. 
 
In investigating the overspend of the project, the attention of the Inquiry came to 
settle upon the way the architect departed from his original brief, and the deficiencies 
in the Corporation’s systems for commissioning and monitoring contracts. As noted 
above, Sam Bunton and Associates had been contracted by the Glasgow Corporation 
to produce a standard ‘design type’ for multi-storey flats, one that exploited existing 
building technologies controlled by the Corporation and served its needs to build 
quickly on a range of sites. The Inquiry found instead that Bunton produced 
something at Red Road that was anything but standard. Nor was it a ‘natural 
outgrowth’ of original contract to devise a standard type (Baird Smith, Sinclair 
Gauldie, and Shankley, 1969, p. 21). Rather Red Road had come to be a ‘novel’, 
‘unprecedented’, ‘experimental’, ‘speculative’, ‘singular’ project, and its claims to 
offer a housing template that was efficient and economical deemed ‘illusory’  (ibid., 
1969, pp. 42, 49, 31, 33, 53, 60). Red Road was, the Inquiry concluded, produced in 
an ‘atmosphere of improvisation’ (ibid, pp. 30). The facts that the Inquiry uncovered 
about Red Road’s production translated it from a design type (standardised, stable, 
mobile) to a crafted object whose final form had been (excessively) influenced by the 
contingencies of its making.   
 
The first of those contingencies was the Red Road site itself. It was only months after 
Sam Bunton and Associates had been engaged to produce a generically applicable 
highrise design type, that a 20-acre ‘in-fill’ building site become available at 
Balornock (ibid, p. 7). It was at this point that a brief to generate generic highrise 
design template/s came to attach itself to the specificities of one particular site, a site 
that Bunton later complained was ‘one of the worst building sites in the city (Bunton, 
1969, p.4). It was also at this point that the usual sequence of building development 
(site-design-build) transformed into a far messier assemblage. One component in this 
rearrangement was the Glasgow Corporation which was involved in its own 
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experiments with a ‘package deal’ or ‘direct labour’ contract, whereby its Buildings 
Department (as opposed to the City Architect) established a design and construct 
contract with Sam Bunton and Associates (Baird Smith, Sinclair Gauldie, and 
Shankley, 1969, p. 20). As noted, the adoption of the ‘package’ model was intended 
to a produce design and construction system that was both efficient and suited to the 
Department’s existing concrete plant. But, pressed by the specificities of Red Road 
(its size and the plot ratios required) Bunton abandoned the work already done on a 
design type using concrete cross-wall construction, increased the height of the 
proposal, and introduced steel as the primary structural material. In the end this 
contractual experiment resulted in the application of a novel construction method 
based on steel, for which the Corporation had few in-house resources and over which 
the City Architect had no control. As the Inquiry found, the density imposed on this 
site ‘destroyed the structural logic of the proposals that were being developed to suit 
the Department’s resources and plant’ (ibid, 1969, p. 20).  
 
The decision to move to steel frame construction produced a range of unpredictable 
associations. In the first instance, the wind loads at Red Road transpired to be so great 
that Bunton’s clean steel frame construction methods could proceed safely only if 
concrete flooring was poured concurrently in-situ in order to stiffen the structure 
during erection (ibid, 1969, p.35) – the very material that Bunton had earlier 
eschewed, concrete, had been called back in to work in partnership with steel. And, 
furthermore, the construction of the steel frame ceased in the wet due to safety 
requirements. In all, the Inquiry found, ‘the lost time in steel erection due to bad 
weather added up to no less that 370 days (ibid, 1969, p.35). To this was added the 
architect’s insufficient understanding of the technical and contractual problems of 
providing adequate plant and cranage facilities for eight buildings in excess of 300 
feet (Bunton, 16 December 1969). As the Inquiry concluded: ‘The twin attractions of 
this experiment were speed and economy. In the event, unless the Red Road method 
can be profitably applied to future schemes, both these aims have failed’ (Baird 
Smith, Sinclair Gauldie, and Shankley, 1969, p. 33). If Red Road was Sam Bunton’s 
(and the Corporation’s) ‘experiment’ in producing a highrise black box, then in the 
end it was deemed to be based on very poor building ‘science’. Historians of the 
tower block in the UK were to subsequently describe Red Road as the most obvious 
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example of the ‘discrepancy between Modern ideals of technically and 
organisationally advanced building, and disorganised practice’ (Glendinning and 
Muthesius, 1994, p. 318).  
 
Part II: The last allies  
  
Some 40 years on any trace of the original vision of Red Road as offering a housing 
black box – the template for a ubiquitous housing solution – had entirely faded. On 
the 9th of March 2005, managers of the Glasgow Housing Association (since 2003 the 
registered social landlords for Red Road, and hereafter referred to as GHA) announced 
a ten-year £60m redevelopment strategy for the Red Road site. This included the 
demolition of 153/183/213 Petershill Drive, , a 26-28 storey slab block containing 312 
flats, one of the largest of the Red Road highrises. Although no announcement has been 
made about the fate of the remaining highrises at Red Road, it is clear they no longer 
have a place within the new vision for the planned low-rise development. In this second 
empirical part of this article we look closely at the beginning of the end of Red Road. 
That end is not a dramatic ‘catastrophic failure’ but rather a long and slow demise. Our 
aim is not to account factually for why Red Road failed, but to give an account of how 
the fact of Red Road as a housing failure gained currency in the context of 
redevelopment visions. This fact secures itself by way of a range of translations of the 
socio-technical event that is Red Road: some of these sought to confirm that Red Road 
should be demolished, others sought to defend Red Road and return it to the system as a 
viable housing solution. We begin by analysing the announcement of the ‘regeneration 
scheme’ that entailed the demolition of Red Road and the way that event – through a 
range of inscriptions such as letters, media releases, and the location of the main media 
event – translated Red Road into a fact of failure. We then examine a meeting of tenants 
and housing campaigners, held in April 2005, whose aim was to generate a set of robust 
alternate facts about Red Road, so countering the official narrative of failure. 
 
Demolishing Red Road 
Some 12 months prior to the redevelopment announcement Red Road residents had 
their first official indication that there may be some truth to the rumours then 
circulating that their homes were to be demolished. In a letter from the GHA, 
residents were called into a consultation process around the topic of the ‘longterm 
future of MSFs [multi-storey flats]’ (GHA, Letter to Occupants, 19 May 2004). While 
stating that no decision had yet been made to demolish the highrises at Red Road, the 
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letter confirmed that their long-term viability was open to question. Included in this 
letter was a list of the ‘problems’ known to be associated with ‘MSFs’ generally: high 
cost of modernisation, low demand, high rents relative to other housing types, high 
maintenance costs, poor environment, lack of community facilities, ‘too many people 
in a small place’ (density), lack of suitability for children. To this list of generic 
problems was to be added a one final, compelling fact, Red Road’s non-traditional 
construction: ‘[t]hey were built using a steel frame which required the widespread use 
of asbestos to ensure adequate protection from fire’. Although posing no immediate 
health risks, the presence of asbestos in the building fabric made attempts to maintain 
and improve the standards of the flats particularly difficult, posing dangers to 
contractors and residents alike. For example, all prospective tenants are warned of the 
danger of asbestos-containing products, and are asked not to puncture wall panels, and 
some repairs require residents to be decanted. Asbestos will even determine the very 
method to be used in demolition (piece-by-piece ‘deconstruction’ as opposed to an 
explosion). As an un-named spokesperson for the GHA concluded: ‘I can’t see a 
situation where anyone could refurbish these houses’ (Evening Times online, 2005). 
The GHA letter is a small but significant inscription within the assemblage of objects 
that work to translate Red Road into a housing failure. It draws upon a wider range of 
inscriptions, including academic analyses (of, say, disinvestment, stigmatisation, 
residualisation), political statements, quantity surveys, each of which to consolidate this 
fact. As the GHA letter reveals, any attempt to complicate or contest the story of Red 
Road’s failure is easily short-circuited by recourse to one ‘irrefutable’ fact: the presence 
of asbestos in the building fabric. 
 
A letter such as this helps produce, by disseminating, the fact of Red Road as a 
housing failure. In the media conference that announced the redevelopment several 
other inscriptions as well as the building itself were performatively called together to 
stabilise and harden that fact. The conference was held in an empty 23rd floor Red 
Road flat. During the event little was said about the ‘problems’ so clearly listed in the 
tenant’s letter. Attention was focussed instead on the redevelopment vision. While the 
GHA officials formally announced the redevelopment plans that day, they also 
counted on the decaying and tenantless flat to eloquently convey the case for 
demolition.iv The announcement was further supplemented by a GHA-commissioned 
computer animation which showed a sequence in which the Red Road highrises 
progressively disappear from the Glasgow skyline (GHA 2005). In this further 
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inscription, the fact of failure has become so stable that even the messy matter of 
planning, financing, and physically demolishing this massive, asbestos-ridden building 
could be bypassed by a simple mouse click. The GHA officials, their inscriptions, and 
the very fabric of the building, conspired to translate Red Road as a housing failure, 
so bringing an ‘end to explanation…cutting off indefinite complexification… tidying 
things up’ (Law, 2003, p. 11). 
 
While the media event and the reportage it generated spread the official claims about the 
failure of Red Road, it also served to embroil greater numbers of people in that fate. This 
inevitably heightened the risk to the GHA’s plans to demolish by exposing them to 
counter-claims. One such dissenting voice was the Red Road Save our Homes 
Campaign which was active for some months after the redevelopment announcement. 
We are not going to offer an account of its emergence or political efficacy here. 
Rather, we wish to deploy the theoretical lens we are working to show something of 
how those drawn together in the name of the Campaign comported themselves in 
relation to the ‘fact’ of Red Road as a housing failure.  In particular, we account for 
the ways in which they sought to contest that fact and to translate Red Road back into 
a viable housing solution. The Campaign staged a public meeting held just one month 
after the redevelopment and demolition announcement in an old school hall on the 
Red Road estate, and attended by around 80 people (Fig. 3). The task that faced those 
gathered that night was a difficult one: how do they contest the fact of failure attached 
to the ‘Red Road multis’? How can they reshape the socio-technical assemblage that 
the redevelopment announcement had generated and avert the fate of demolition? And 
would the building technology of Red Road, along with the various translations of it, 





Fig. 3. The Red Road Save Our Homes Campaign Meeting. Authors’ image. 
  
The Red Road Save our Homes Campaign meeting brings together a new 
arrangement of people: residents who might not have met before, neighbours form 
nearby highrise estates, local politicians and housing activists. That the instigator of 
this meeting could call the group gathered there the ‘Red Road Save our Homes 
Campaign’ gave stability to a collective where none existed. The work had yet to be 
done of ordering the people gathered there into active allies who would work towards 
another destiny for Red Road. In the first instance this labour fell to the instigator of 
the meeting (a Red Road resident and housing activist) and his invited speakers (other 
non-local housing activists and a Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP)), all of 
who were seated, separately from the audience, at a table at the front of the hall. The 
right of those gathered at the table to speak on behalf of Red Road was by no means 
clear and much of the early part of the meeting was dedicated to establishing this. The 
designated speakers variously spoke about their credentials: as a concerned local 
resident (the meeting instigator), as housing activists who understood the political 
background, or as an elected representative with experience dealing with the GHA. 
They sought to galvanize their authority to articulate (translate) on behalf of tenants 
an alternate set of facts about Red Road. At one point a tenant stood up and 
challenged the speakers, accusing them of political interests and specifically of being 
there simply to support the political aspirations of the instigator of the meeting. The 
challenge required a response:  
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‘Concerning the political aspect I disagree entirely. The gentleman, who stood 
over there [pointing to the meeting instigator], lives in Red Road and has lived 
there all his life. He has actually stood as a candidate for the election…[but] he 
has never announced that [here]. So he is not here political. He is here because 
he cares about the people. And so is everybody else at this top table.’ (Speaker 
B, audio campRR, 00:51:39) 
 
Additional work by the speakers gathered at the table was directed at establishing 
what exactly residents were up against – to make clear the ‘real’ reasons why Red 
Road was being demolished. One housing activist named the GHA and an agenda of 
privitisation: 
 
‘They are saying … they are going to build six hundred new homes ….What is 
it about? It is selling off the land for private housing development, and bringing 
in middle-income families and kicking out low-income families. That’s the real 
agenda by the Glasgow Housing Association Limited.’ (Speaker A, audio 
campRR, 00:10:53). 
 
Another attached an academically defined term to the process: ‘There is a name for it. 
I think the academics use the name of gentrification’ (Speaker B, audio campRR, 
00:20:49). A third speaker animated the enemy by linking the proposed demolition to 
a familiar ghost: 
 
 ‘Scotland is actually been used as a laboratory by New Labour Tories in the 
same way as Margaret Thatcher attempted to use this country as a laboratory in 
an experiment…with the poll tax. Housing is gonna become the new poll tax.’ 
(Speaker C, audio campRR, 00:32:23). 
 
We have seen how the media event and associated inscriptions operated to short-
circuit any complications stemming from the designation of Red Road as a housing 
failure, so facilitating the demolition of the highrises. In contrast, spokespeople at the 
Campaign meeting sought to linger precisely on those complications, to coax them 
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into being, to enlarge them and to explore their potential to engender alternate points 
of view, and other facts, pertaining to the fate of Red Road. The more effective the 
Campaign was at elaborating such other facts, the more effectively they could 
destabilise the fact of Red Road as a housing failure, and the more compelling their 
alternate visions for the viability of Red Road could become.  
 
Re-materialising Red Road 
Establishing other facts about Red Road was a central part of the discussion that 
night. But in the course of the meeting the question of whether Red Road itself – its 
material fabric – was worth saving stubbornly persisted. The building itself, along 
with the professionals and amateur ‘experts’ who offered translations of it, remained a 
forceful actor and, consequently, continued to foreground the complex socio-technical 
character of the event. This is usefully illustrated by one woman’s intervention from 
the floor and the responses it generated. Prefacing her comments with the warning 
that ‘you might not like what I have to say’, and contesting a claim from another 
resident about the structural soundness of the highrises, the woman told the meeting a 
story: 
 
‘I live 29up in the 213 block. My next-door neighbour is right here in front of 
me. I am 29 up. I had an inspector out from Allied Construction and he told me 
that the blocks were not structurally sound. There is structural damage my 
house suffers from. I mean you see the cracks in the walls opening and closing 
with winds, the high winds. What I was told was, don’t paint the walls put up 
wallpaper and hide it. And they came out with boxes of Polyfilla’ (Audience A, 
audio campRR, 00:59:51) 
 
Rather than recruiting this woman as an ally to the Campaign cause, and transforming 
her into a housing activist, the meeting served as a forum for her to ‘question’ the 
building’s structural integrity and support the case for building failure. The speakers 
at the table tried to repair the situation: 
 
‘I just want to say, people keep using this term structurally unsound. That isn’t a 
proper term. And if this buildings actually were structurally unsound… If they 
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actually were you would have an hour to pack and you could… and get out.’ 
(Speaker D, campRR, 01:06:57) 
 
‘Now, that cannot be verified other than through professional independent 
opinion. If you have got professional independent architects, who are prepared 
to comment and have a look at those blocks and tell you if they were 
structurally sound. My suspicion would be that they are structurally sound. You 
know… In terms of multis people say, well multis have only got a limited shelf 
life. Well look at the Empire State Building. That’s been up for a fair long time. 
That does not show any sign of sort of collapsing in any time shortly.’ (Speaker 
C, audio campRR, 01:04:41) 
 
In order to keep the idea of a Campaign valid, and the emergent collective tied 
together, the speakers at the table, in turn, transformed themselves into legal advisers 
and structural engineers. They try and repair the buildings by repairing what is known 
about the buildings. In so doing they place this woman, her cracked wall and her 
doubts, outside of the emerging Campaign collective. Suddenly it appears that the 
activists – most of whom do not reside at Red Road – care more about Red Road than 
she does. She challenges this arrangement: 
 
‘Well I think you have taken what I have said the wrong way that I hate these 
flats. I love my flat. Don’t get me wrong. I do. I adore my flat. I have spent a 
fortune doing that flat up, and all on contract. But at the same time, I can’t 
afford to decorate every year because these walls are opening up.’ (Audience A, 
01:06:35). 
 
This resident gives perfect expression to the ‘uncertain fact’ that it at the heart of the 
meeting that evening, and of the controversy of Red Road (Callon, Lacoumes and 
Barthe (2001).  
 
Translating Red Road 2 
Controversies compel other facts to be collected and solutions to be proposed. The 
organisers of the Red Road meeting sought to initiate a process whereby alternate 
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facts could be collected and around which a vision for Red Road that did not include 
demolition could be built. To do this work, those gathered at the table had to call upon 
the residents of Red Road. From the moment the GHA announced their plans to 
redevelop the Red Road site,  those who opposed demolition of the Red Road 
highrises argued that residents’ views had been discounted from the decision-making 
process. Speaking at the time of the demolition announcement, a Red Road housing 
activist complained that the: 
 
‘consultation process could have been better. A small questionnaire was carried 
out last year but we wanted a social survey, which never materialised’ 
(Springburn Herald, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Conducting a social survey became a primary preoccupation of the meeting that night, 
and the Campaign more generally. The hope of organisers was that a social survey 
would be the mechanism by which they could assemble a robust set of alternate facts . 
It was a view grounded in a specific style of housing activism, and which was 
presented to the residents assembled in the hall as a strategy with a track record of 
success based on the experience of residents in the neighbouring highrise estate of 
Sighthill, where ‘their own independent survey’ was understood to have been pivotal 
in the GHA’s decision to upgrade rather than demolish. That the collection of 
resident’s views, through the device of the social survey, was the right way to 
structure a campaign was never questioned during the meeting. As one speaker put it: 
‘The survey – you’ve got to get behind it. It is not even a question to get behind it.’ 
(Speaker D, audio campRR, 00:42:23). The only question to be resolved at the 
meeting, it seemed, was how to best undertake it.  
 
Surveying is a practice that unfolds in between the field and, what Latour (1987, pp. 
215-257) has described as, a ‘centre of calculation’. A questionnaire has to be 
designed by the organisers in a survey centre (here a Campaigner’s home or a 
community hall), questionnaires have to be dispatched in the field (here through the 
doors of Red Road flats), interviews have to be carried out (with tenants), forms filled 
and collected (by volunteers), findings calculated and evaluated a in a centre of 
calculation (using tables, graphs and diagrams), and a final report produced and 
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publicised. Together these steps constitute a process of ‘translation’, allowing the 
final report and the ‘centre of calculation’ to speak on behalf of all those interviewed 
(Murdoch, 1997, p. 327).  
 
Determining the details of that translation process, how the survey work was to be 
done, was a contentious issue for the meeting, not least because conducting a survey 
in a highrise building like Red Road, with its density and history of residualisation, 
produces specific socio-technical challenges. There are lots of doors to knock on, 
people are not always home, and those who are might not co-operate. Whether the 
survey should be conducted by a face-to-face, door-to-door method using volunteers 
was questioned by an unlikely source, the Campaign instigator. He spoke from 
personal experience: 
 
‘We collectors we did get a lot of abuse from people when going door-to-door. 
So I am still not in favour of this going door-to-door. I am sorry I am saying 
that right now. We are not going from door to door.’ (Campaign leader, audio 
campRR, 1:12:37) 
 
Refusing to undertake the survey face-to-face and door-to-door threatened the 
translation process that the Campaign organisers had already assumed was so 
essential. Without a ‘proper’ survey (with a good response rate), the ability of the 
Campaign to generate robust alternate facts about Red Road would be compromised. 
The meeting desperately canvassed for a solution that would allow the survey to 
proceed. Finally, it was agreed to designate a place where tenants could drop off 
completed forms. This strategy sought to stabilise the survey by changing the 
operators (volunteers collecting) and movements (how they collect) between the 
centre of calculation (a local office) and the field (the flats). But even this new system 
was questioned on the grounds that older residents might not be physically capable of 
returning their forms to a central office. Despite this, the Campaign instigator 
reiterated why a door-to-door system was not feasible:  
 
‘Can I make my point? It was muggins that delivered survey forms to every flat 
in this estate: Me, on my own! So that’s one person that delivered all your 
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survey forms. We do not have the amount of [volunteers] that go to the doors 
even once, never mind two or three times. Forget it!’ (Campaign organiser, 
audio campRR, 01:16:56) 
 
The disagreement about the survey method was not resolved that evening, rather a 
new problem emerged: how to get enough volunteers. The final call of the organisers 
was for members of the audience to sign on as volunteers, not to go door-to-door, but 
to become a member of a committee that could discuss how the survey should be 
done. Signing on to this list became an urgent matter for it was this inscription that 
would hold this disparate group together as a Campaign. It was this list that would 
translate residents into Campaigners, and it was this list that could be taken away 
from the meeting and used to initiate further action in defence of Red Road. 
 
‘Can I just finishing by saying we are getting the names for the committee and 
also when the committee meets they can decide how they are going to approach 
the [survey]. And that’s the way how to do it.’ (Speaker A, audio campRR, 
01:23: 04) 
 
At the end of the meeting a group of disparate people that should have been 
transformed (through the meeting, the list, and the commitment to a survey) into a 
well-sized and powerful collective supporting Red Road, did not materialise. At the 




In this paper we have sought to put the Red Road highrise, past and present, in touch 
with analytical tools delivered by studies in science and technology. We argue that  
this enables the the socio-technical co-production of the world of highrise housing to 
come into view. This perspective solicits a more heterogeneous range of actors and 
forces (human and non-human) which is especially useful when considering the 
socio-technical assemblage produced by the highrise. As we have shown, the existing 
accounts of the highrise as a residential form have tended to follow either a 
technological determinism or a social constructivism, as if it is possible and necessary 
 32
to keep the social and the technical apart. Throughout this paper we have sought to 
keep the social and the technical in association and we have done so because we 
believe that this better accounts for the diverse forces at work in shaping and 
reshaping a housing event like Red Road. To take up this view does not mean that we 
ignore process more routinely labelled as ‘agency’ or ‘politics’ or ‘structure’, but it 
does mean that we are always interested in not assuming a force, or ordering of 
forces, a priori. In this sense, our task has been, to paraphrase Latour (2005),  ‘to keep 
the [highrise] flat’, that is, to keep the social and the material (and, we might add, the 
micro and the macro) on the same explanatory plane. 
 
The specific analytical tool we deployed in relation to Red Road, was the science and 
technology studies’ concept of the black box. This is especially relevant for 
understanding the highrise which, like no other housing type, was spawned out of an 
architectural and bureaucratic vision that wished to harness technological logics to the 
provision of a mass social housing solution. We show how the highrise was conceived 
of as a housing black box: a technology that would be ubiquitous, without controversy 
and which, because of an absence of dissenters, could spread to many users. In the 
case of Red Road, as with many other British translations, this was not to be the case. 
In the first instance, we explored this more messy trajectory historically, showing the 
socio-technical shaping of an avant-garde housing design, into a bureaucratic mass 
housing vision, and then into the specificities of a the Red Road building process. The 
result was not a black box, but a crafted object about which many questions could be 
(and were) asked. In the second instance, we explored this ethnographically, by 
looking in detail at the socio-technical drama of a Campaign to resist the planned 
demolition of Red Road. Through our account of the ‘birth’ of Red Road we saw the 
way in which the making of Red Road was a provisional stabilisation, drawing 
together a range of materials, institutions, people and knowledges around the idea of a 
highrise housing solution. In the ‘death’ of Red Road we saw the way in which its 
designation as a housing ‘failure’ and the announcement to demolish reassembles its 
socio-technical network, dropping away old allies and bringing in new ones, 
producing new translations of its worth, and intensifying efforts to variously ‘close’ or 
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i This said, Dunleavy (1981, p. 6) also notes that the rhetorical dependence upon justifying a 
commitment to highrises in terms of technological innovation belied the fact that the technology was 
not that new: what was ‘new’ was the linking of this technology to an emergent market. In the British 
context, Dunleavy (1981, p. 57) notes, technology came eventually to offer only a ‘weak determinism’ 
for highrise housing visions, and was drawn upon as a rationale selectively and interchangeably with 
social and economic arguments. This line of argument is mirrored in Reyner Banham’s critique of Le 
Corbusier’s loudly-proclaimed commitment to technology and mass production processes. He 
concluded that, in relation to Le Corbusier’s own architectural output, ‘most of his most celebrated 
“machine age” effects were achieved with very primitive building technologies, descending, in later 
designs, to plain fakery’ (Banham, 1981, p. 41). A more academic investigation of the question of 
architecture, technology and domestic life, was Siegfried Giedion’s (1948) book Mechanization takes 
Command, in which he charts the penetration of less spectacular, ‘anonymous’, technologies into all 
spheres of society. 
ii This is akin Giedeon’s gleaning the sub-literatures of manufacturer’s records, product catalogues and 
advertising leaflets to assemble his ‘anonymous history’ (1948, p. iv) of moderrn technology. 
iii Historians of asbestos exposure in Scotland have recorded a trade union official recalling going onto 
the Red Road construction site in 1966 to warn workers of the danger of working with asbestos. He 
was told to “‘fuck off’ and not interfere’ (Johnston and McIvor 2000). 
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iv Although redevelopment and demolition were not announced until March 2005, a policy of not re-
letting for two years. By the time it was announced that 153/183/213 Petershill Drive was to be 
demolished it was estimated to be only 1/3 occupied.  
